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ARKANSAS' NEW CHOICE OF LAW RULE FOR
INTERSTATE TORTS: A CRITIQUE OF
W4LLIS, WILLIAMS, AND THE
"BETTER RULE OF LAW"
L. LYNN HOGUE*
The development of Arkansas' modem response to the problem of
resolving interstate torts begins with Wallis v. Mrs. Smith ' Pie Co. I In
Wallis, Arkansas residents sued in Arkansas for injuries suffered in
Missouri when a truck driven by a Pennsylvania resident struck their
car from behind. Defendant, a foreign corporation with its principal
place of business in Pennsylvania and authorized to do business in Ar-
kansas, was the registered owner of the truck. The Arkansas Supreme
Court recounted the accident as follows:
[Plaintiffs] had been traveling about an hour when they ran into a heavy
snowstorm. Because of the accumulation of ice and snow, the right lane
of the interstate on which they were traveling had become hazardous and
so [the plaintiff-driver] pulled into the left lane which he thought was in
better condition.
[The defendant's driver] had been following a furniture van in the right
lane of the highway for about five miles. Immediately before the accident
[defendant's truck] changed into the passing lane and struck [plaintiffs'
car] from the rear. At the time of the accident the truck was traveling
approximately 50 miles per hour while [the car] was traveling at a speed
of about 20 to 35 miles per hour.2
A major consideration in the case was the effect of a Missouri rule of
the road, in force at the time of the accident, that required
"'automobiles to travel in the right-hand lane of a highway having two
or more lanes of traffic proceeding in the same direction except under
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock. A.B., 1966, William
Jewell College; M.A., 1968, Ph.D., 1972, University of Tennessee; J.D., 1974, Duke University.
Member, North Carolina Bar.
I would like to acknowledge the students in my Spring 1978 conflicts class who through their
inquisitiveness and enthusiasm provoked this article and Stephen L. Hardin, a third-year student,
who served as my research assistant.
. 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977); see 1 U.A.L.R. L.J. 103 (1978).
2. 261 Ark. at 623-24, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
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certain specified conditions not applicable [to this accident]."' 3 Defend-
ant sought and received from the trial judge instruction on the Missouri
statute4 together with a judicial gloss that "[a] violation of this statute is
negligence."5 This placed defendant in an ideal position to benefit
from Missouri's contributory negligence law.6  Plaintiffs, of course,
sought to avail themselves of Arkansas' law on comparative negli-
gence.7 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the Arkansas compara-
tive fault statute,8 rather than Missouri's contributory negligence
statute,9 would determine the consequences of an Arkansas resident-
plaintiff's negligence in Missouri. t" Prior to the Wallis decision, Ar-
kansas had applied the law of the place of the accident (lex loci delictt)
to interstate torts.1'
Wallis places Arkansas among those states rejecting the mechanical
choice of law rule advocated by the first Restatement, ' 2 which its princi-
3. Id (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 304.015(6) (Vernon Supp. 1973)):
All vehicles in motion upon a highway having two or more lanes of traffic proceeding
in the same direction shall be driven in the right hand lane except when overtaking and
passing another vehicle or when preparing to make a proper left turn or when otherwise
directed by traffic markings, signs or signals.
4. Id. at 624-25, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
5. Id Leflar similarly concludes that "by Missouri law plaintiff was negligent also because
he was violating the Missouri statute by driving in the wrong lane." Leflar, Conflict of Laws.-
Arkansas, 1973-77, 32 ARK. L. REV. 115 (1978).
6. "In pleading to a proceeding, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... contributory negli-
gence... .. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.090 (Vernon 1952).
7. 261 Ark. at 624, 550 S.W.2d at 454. The Arkansas comparative fault statute in force at
the time of the accident reads:
1. The word "fault" as used in this Act includes negligence, wilful and wanton con-
duct, supplying of a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous condition, or any
other act or omission or conduct actionable in tort.
2. Fault chargeable to a party claiming damages shall not bar recovery of damages
for any injury, property damage, or death where the fault of the person injured or killed
is of less degree than the fault of any person, firm, or corporation causing such damages.
3. In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to
property, fault chargeable to a claiming party shall not prevent a recovery where any
fault chargeable to the person so injured, damaged, or killed is of less degree than any
fault of the person, firm, or corporation causing such damage; provided, that where such
fault is chargeable to the person injured, damaged, or killed, the amount of recovery
shall be diminished in proportion to such fault.
1973 Ark. Acts No. 303, §§ 1-3 (repealed 1975 Ark. Acts No. 367, §§ 1-3 (current version at ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977)).
8. Id
9. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509.090 (Vernon 1952); see note 6 supra.
10. 261 Ark. at 632, 550 S.W.2d at 458.
11. McGinty v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966). Compare d.,
with Turkey Express, Inc. v. Skelton Motor Co., 246 Ark. 739, 439 S.W.2d 923 (1969).
12. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
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pal author Joseph H. Beale 3 grounded on concepts of territoriality14
and vested rights.' 5 As others discredited Beale's theories, 16 and courts
avoided them through the escape devices so familiar to every conflicts
student,' 7 choice of law came to rest on considerations other than the
place of the wrong."t
Professor Brainerd Currie developed a method of interest analysis
that invited identification of competing governmental policies implicit
in conflicting laws.' He distinguished true conflicts from false con-
flicts: A true conflict exists where two jurisdictions have identifiable
policies that would be furthered by application of their respective laws.
In a false conflict, one state has no claim (or a spurious claim) for the
application of its law and the other state has a legitimate claim. An-
other category is the "unprovided-for" case in which an examination of
interests and policies does not yield a solution because a disinterested
forum is unable to choose between competing policies in which it has
no stake. °
Recently, scholars have devoted significant effort to the articulation
13. See J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
14. Eg., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of action in tort
is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no
cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."
15. Eg., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). See also Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 477-78, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1963) (the traditional approach
"had its conceptual foundation in the vested rights doctrine, namely, that a right to recover for a
foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred and depends
for its existence and extent solely on such law").
16. E.g., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1949). "Walter
Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can
ever discredit the intellectual produce of another." Currie, On the Displacement of the Law ofthe
Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964, 966 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (1963). See also E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1947).
17. Eg., University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936) (renvoi);
Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (characterization).
18. See Morris, The Proper Law f/a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951).
19. See B. CURRIE, supra note 16.
20. For summaries of Currie's methodology, see R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 221-24 (2d ed. 1975); W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 469-71 (7th ed. 1978); Sedler, The Go vernmental Interest Approach to Choice
of Law.- An Analysis and Re/ormulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181, 186-90 (1977). Several com-
mentators have criticized Currie's methods. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW
185-89 (3d ed. 1977); Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the 'Better Rule" Threat and Promise in
Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 847 (1967); Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. Rnv. 74
(1967). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 n.17, 16 n.18, 315, 348 (1962); W. REESE
& M. ROSENBERG, supra, at 472-73.
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and refinement of factors, as distinguished from interests and policies,
to weigh in the resolution of choice of law questions. Building on the
nine factors that Cheatham and Reese identified in 1952,1' Professor
Yntema developed seventeen considerations reducible to two primary
groupings-security and comparative justice.22 The factors receiving
the greatest measure of judicial approbation,23 however, have been the
five "choice-influencing considerations"'24 first announced in 196625 by
Professor Robert Leflar and developed in a series of articles26 and in
his treatise, American Conflicts Law.27 The five factors Leflar stressed
as significant are: (1) predictability of results, (2) maintenance of inter-
state and international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4)
advancement of the forum's governmental interest, and (5) application
of the "better rule of law."
28
21. Cheatham & Reese, Choice ofthe Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952). Listed
in order of importance they are: (1) the needs of the interstate and international system;
(2) application of local law unless there is good reason for not doing so; (3) effectuation of the
purpose of the relevant local rule in determining a question of choice of law; (4) certainty, pre-
dictability, uniformity of results; (5) protection ofjustified expectations; (6) application of the law
of the state of dominant interest; (7) ease in determination of applicable law, convenience of the
court; (8) the fundamental policy underlying the broad local law field involved; and (9) justice in
the individual case. Id.
Professor Reese subsequently added a tenth policy: "The court must follow the dictates of its
own legislature, provided these dictates are constitutional." Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Re-
statement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 682 (1963).
22. Yntema, The Objectives ofPrivate InternationalLaw, 35 CAN. B. REv. 721, 734-35 (1957).
For example, Yntema includes uniformity of legal consequences, minimization of conflicts of law,
predictability of legal consequences, the reasonable expectations of the parties, uniformity of so-
cial and economic consequences, validation of transactions, relative significance of contacts, rec-
ognition of the "stronger" law, cooperation among states, respect for interests of other states,
justice of the end results, respect for policies of domestic law, internal harmony of the substantive
rules to be applied, location or nature of the transaction, utility, homogeneity of national law, and
recourse to the lexfori. Id
23. R. LEFLAR, supra note 20, at 103-07, 138.
24. See Tiernan v. Westext Transp., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256 (D.R.I. 1969); Satchwill v. Voll-
rath Co., 293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550
S.W.2d 453 (1977); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell v. Craft,
211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Homer,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
25. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 267 (1966);
Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Leflar, More on Choice].
26. See Leflar, supra note 5, at 14-16; Leflar, Choice of Law: .4 Well- Watered Plateau, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 10 (1977); Leflar, True "False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 B.U.L. REV. 164
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Leflar, True "False Conflicts'l.
27. R. LEFLAR, supra note 20.
28. Id at 193-95, 205-19. Leflar's list has proven more acceptable to judges than has the
sophisticated functional analysis approach of Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman, A. VON
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The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Wallis to lay aside
the territorial principle in favor of "a more flexible approach" 29 came
as no surprise. The 1966 decision in McGinty v. Ballentine Produce,
Inc. 3o indicated that the court would reexamine the question of appro-
priate choice of law rules for interstate torts when it found a stronger
case on its facts. And in the interim, Professor Leflar suggested that the
court adopt a new rule:
It can be assumed that the Arkansas Court will reexamine its outmoded
torts-conflicts rule carefully when a new case presents the issue squarely.
No vested interests arising from reliance on the old choice-of-law rule can
possibly exist. There is no reason why a wiser rule based upon the rele-
vant choice-influencing considerations should not be announced when the
opportunity occurs. 31
In Wallis, the court did not neglect the opportunity to approve a
choice of law rule based upon Leflar's analysis. There is some ques-
tion, however, whether Wallis was the proper vehicle for changing Ar-
kansas' torts conflicts rule, indeed whether Wallis even presented the
issue squarely. Wallis was exceptional because of the court's uncritical
adoption of Leflar's theory under the facts of the case without reference
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965), which "requires, for an
informed choice of law, an examination of the purposes of the [implicated states'] rules vying for
application and a determination whether those purposes would be effectuated by application in
the case before the court." Gorman, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 288, 290 (1966). Nor have
the views of Russell Weintraub, who analyzes various conflict of laws issues with respect to domi-
cile, jurisdiction, family law, torts, contracts, property, and constitutional limitations, found wide
acceptance. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971); Conflict of
Laws Round Table: A Symposium, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1219 (1972). Cavers' "principles of prefer-
ence" have met with a similar fate. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS (1965).
Professor Cavers had admitted to greater confidence in the idea that principles of prefer-
ence are necessary than in the particular formulation he has advanced. He is satisfied
that as courts consciously strive for principled decisions and as precedents accumulate,
better principles and a more just choice of law process will evolve.
W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 476-77. Nor have Professor Twerski's views been
widely adopted. See Sedler, supra note 20, at 204-08. Twerski calls his approach to interest anal-
ysis in choice of law decisions the "new and enlightened territorialism." Id at 204 (citing Twer-
ski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DUQ. L. REV.
373 (1971)). Its essence "is that choice of law decisions should be made with reference to the place
where legally significant events occurred rather than with reference to the policies and interests
reflected in the laws of the involved states." Id See also Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the
Horses, 61 Ky. L.J. 393, 399-400, 407-10 (1972); Twerski, Book Review, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
1045, 1046 n.12 (1976).
29. 261 Ark. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 456.
30. 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966); see R. CRAmToN, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, supra
note 20, at 247.
31. Leflar, Conflict of Laws. Arkansas, 1969-72, 27 ARK. L. REV. I (1973).
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to the content of foreign as well as forum law.32 A careful inquiry into
Missouri law shows that the Arkansas Supreme Court need never have
reached the conflict of laws issue.
In applying Arkansas law, the court ignored the content of applica-
ble Missouri law on the questions whether plaintiffs were negligent and
whether Missouri law permitted recovery by contributorily negligent
plaintiffs. Thus an examination of the legal status of the parties under
Missouri law reveals that although the applicable Missouri statute re-
quired a driver on a road with more than two lanes to drive in the right
lane,33 Missouri courts have held that compliance may be excused
under certain circumstances,34 the existence of which is a question of
fact for the jury.35
The importance of this excuse from strict compliance with the stat-
ute, ignored in Wallis, is illustrated by a strikingly similar Missouri
case. In Calvert v. Super Propane Corp.,36 plaintiff's decedent was driv-
ing across the center line on the left side of an icy two-lane road in
violation of a Missouri rule of the road.37 The Missouri Supreme
Court held that the violation did not constitute contributory negligence
as a matter of law:
Upon finding these facts the jury could have concluded that deceased was
not negligent in following the single, two-lane track that everybody on this
county road was using, and that if the soft, wet snow on either side of the
traveled track were used it would be more hazardous to deceased's safety
than the traveled portion. Whether deceased did what any reasonable
32. Under Professor Leflar's approach to determining conflict of laws, "[a] state's 'govern-
mental interest' in a set of facts can be analyzed only by reference to the content of competing
rules of law." Leflar, More on Choice, supra note 25, at 1587.
33. 261 Ark. at 624-25, 550 S.W.2d at 454 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 304.015(6) (Vernon
Supp. 1973)). See note 3 supra.
34. Hladyshewski v. Robinson, 557 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1977); German v. Kansas City, 512
S.W.2d 135 (Mo. 1974).
35. See German v. Kansas City, 512 S.W.2d 135, 148 (Mo. 1974).
There is no question that at the time of the collision plaintiff was driving westerly in a
lane intended for eastbound traffic. However, it has been demonstrated that plaintiff
made a submissible case on whether he was deluded, misled and deceived into driving in
a lane he thought proper for west-bound traffic; and thus it was/or thejury to say whether
plaintifl had a valid excusefor his violation.
Id (emphasis added). The court in German cited Rice v. Allen, 309 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1958), Tener
v. Hill, 394 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. App. 1965), and Wines v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 246
S.W.2d 525 (Mo. App. 1952), and distinguished Roach v. Lacho, 402 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1966).
36. 400 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. 1966).
37. Id at 137 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 304.015(2) (Vernon Supp. 1973) ("Upon all public
roads or highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway
.... 11)).
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man would have done. was for the jury to determine under all of the
facts and circumstances.3 8
Under Missouri law, therefore, the Wallis jury, if properly instructed,
could have found that defendant's driver was negligent39 and that
under the circumstances plaintiff was not negligent in driving in the left
lane to avoid an accumulation of ice and snow in the right lane. Fairly
viewed, Missouri law was favorable to plaintiff.40
On appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, appellant challenged the
trial judge's instruction by raising the question whether the trial court
had erred in instructing on Missouri law absent proof in the record.
The court held as a procedural matter that there was adequate notice
under the Arkansas Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act.4' What was objectionable, of course, was not the notice given but
rather the instruction itself, Z e., the trial judge's erroneous conclusion
that "violation of [the Missouri] statute is negligence. ' 42 That instruc-
tion foreclosed the issue of excuse or justification, which Missouri law
would have treated as a matter for jury determination.43
In addition to the argument that plaintiff was not negligent and
therefore not barred from recovery under Missouri law, there is the
equally powerful excuse of last clear chance." The doctrine, known in
Missouri as the humanitarian doctrine,45 has been liberalized and ex-
38. 400 S.W.2d at 137. Arkansas courts treat the violation of a statute as evidence of negli-
gence. See, e.g., Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91 (1977); Duckworth v. Stephens,
182 Ark. 161, 30 S.W.2d 840 (1930).
Missouri courts treat the unexcused violation of a statute as negligence per se. See, e.g., Sayers
v. Haushalter, 493 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. 1973); Vanasse v. Plautz, 538 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. App. 1976);
Bidleman v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 273 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. App. 1954).
39. The truck was traveling approximately 50 miles per hour, the Wallis' vehicle, 20 to 35
miles per hour. Note further that "[t]he Missouri state trooper investigating the accident testified
the roads were so slick his car slid past the accident." 261 Ark. at 624, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
40. See notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text. The plaintiffs mother, who failed to es-
tablish error in the record of her cause of action on appeal would likewise be free of negligence,
imputed or otherwise, and entitled to recover.
41. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2504 (Supp. 1977). Cf. Turkey Express, Inc. v. Skelton Motor Co.,
246 Ark. 739, 439 S.W.2d 923 (1969) (inadequate objection).
42. 261 Ark. at 624, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
43. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
44. See general), W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 427-33 (4th ed. 1971).
45. Price v. Nicholson, 340 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1960); Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 375
SW.2d 641, 642 (Mo. App. 1964). See also Elser v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 585 F.2d 903 (8th Cir.
1978) (per curiam); Brown v. Gamin, 525 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1975).
The great exception [to the rule of "no recovery" by inattentive plaintiffs] is Missouri,
which has evolved a rather marvelous so-called "humanitarian doctrine," fearful and
wonderful in its ramifications, which allows recovery. It appears to have begun as a
distinction between a defendant operating a dangerous machine, such as a railroad train
Number 4]
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tended to excuse plaintiff's negligence in cases where the defendant
should have, but did not in fact discover plaintiffs peril.46 Therefore,
the Wallis court's finding that "Missouri follows the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence which is a complete defense to any action brought
by a negligent plaintiff"' is an inaccurate and incomplete interpreta-
tion. In fact, Missouri has substantially ameliorated "the evils of [its]
harsh rule of contributory negligence."4"
Wallis would appear to be a compelling case for the application of
Missouri's humanitarian doctrine. Plaintiffs were in the left lane of a
four-lane highway when defendant's truck "changed into the passing
lane and struck [plaintiffs' car] from the rear."49 Arguably, the truck
driver had the last clear chance to avoid injury and under Missouri law
or an automobile, and a plaintiff who was not, and to have become transformed instead
into a doctrine favoring the plaintiff where both parties were equally, and similarly, at
fault. Unquestionably it represents an attempt to stress the greater importance of human
safety over the convenience and financial interests of defendants; but its application has
been marked by such great confusion, and so many appeals, that no other court has been
tempted to follow the Missouri cases.
W. PRossan, supra note 44, at 431-32. Notwithstanding its difficulty of application, Missouri's
rule, for conflict of law purposes, should be entitled to correct ascertainment and consideration by
foreign courts. The issue is its application, not its adoption, by the forum courts. See Price v.
Nicholson, 340 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1960); Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 375 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. App.
1964).
46. One commentator distinguishes last clear chance from "humanitarian" cases as follows:
Case No. I-The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from physical help-
lessness caused by plaintiffs lack of care. Defendant actually discovers the peril in time,
thereafter, with safety to himself, to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care.
This is a simple last clear chance case .... Case No. 2-The facts are the same as in
Case 1, except that the defendant does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise
of care he should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the exercise of care and
with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of courts permit plaintiff to recover for
personal injury or property damage under the last clear chance rule. . . . Case No.
3-The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from plaintiff's negligent inat-
tentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri judicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actu-
ally discovers the peril, in time, thereafter to avoid damage to the plaintiff by the exercise
of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanitarian case.... Case No.
4-The injured person, his property, or both, are in a position of imminent peril as a
result of his negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured party could extricate
himself from his peril by his own efforts, if he were aware of his peril and used care. The
defendant or party against whom claim for damages is made does not actually discover
the peril of the injured party. Nevertheless, in the exercise of care the party causing
injury should have discovered the peril in time thereafter with safety to himself by the
use of care to have avoided injury to the plaintiff. In other words the party causing the
injury is also inattentive (oblivious). The Missouri courts permit recovery by the injured
party in this case; and in this respect are more liberal than courts of other jurisdictions.
Becker, The Humanitarian Doctrine, 15 Mo. L. REV. 359, 360 (1959).
47. 261 Ark. at 627, 550 S.W.2d at 455 (citation omitted).
48. Miller v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 375 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo. App. 1964).
49. 261 Ark. at 624, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
ARKANSAS' NEW CHOICE OF LAW RULE
he would be liable regardless of whether he saw plaintiffs' car.5"
The applicability of Missouri's humanitarian doctrine hinges on sat-
isfaction of the five tests set forth in Banks v. Morris & Co.:
(1) Plaintiff was in a position of peril; (2) defendant had notice thereof (if
it was the duty of defendant to have been on the lookout, constructive
notice suffices); (3) defendant after receiving such notice had the present
ability, with the means at hand, to have averted the impending injury to
himself or others; (4) he failed to exercise ordinary care to avert such
impending injury, and (5) by reason thereof plaintiff was injured.52
Although the facts suggest plaintiff might have prevailed under Mis-
souri's humanitarian doctrine, the certainty of that result is not of im-
mediate importance. Fuller evidence was needed on, for example, the
third Banks test of whether defendant's employee could have avoided
the collision without injury to himself. What is important is that the
Wallis court ignored the availability of a defense to contributory negli-
gence. This omission, like the false assumption that Missouri always
treats the violation of a statute as negligence per se, removes Wallis
from the false conflict5 3 category. Viewed as a false conflict, Arkansas
has an interest in applying its comparative fault statute to a resident
plaintiff; Pennsylvania, defendant's principal place of business,54 which
also follows comparative fault, may have an interest;55 but Missouri's
only interest is as the situs of the accident, which gives it no claim to
enforce an anti-recovery rule.56 Missouri's rule, however, does not
foreclose a negligent plaintiffs recovery. Instead, Wallis presents only
an apparent true conflict or apparent conflict5 7 in which two rules of
50. See note 3 supra.
51. 302 Mo. 254, 257 S.W. 482 (1924).
52. Id at 257, 257 S.W. at 484. For a detailed discussion of the application of the tests, see
Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535, 540-43 (Mo. 1977).
53. Leflar's reservations about the term "false conflict," Leflar, True "False Conflicts," supra
note 26, at 169, are recognized, but not shared by this author.
54. 261 Ark. at 623, 550 S.W.2d at 454.
55. Id. at 632, 550 S.W.2d at 458.
56. See B. CJRRIE, supra note 16, at 144-45 (situs of injury has an interest in applying a
liability rule to meet medical and other expenses occasioned by the accident). Compare Reich v.
Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (Missouri has no interest in applying
its limitation of damages to a wrongful death action based on a Missouri accident involving Ohio
and California residents).
57. Currie's theory, see note 56 supra, recognized an apparent conflict "in effect, a false con-
flict, calling for application of the law of the only state found to have an interest." See also R.
CRAMTON , D. CURIE, & H. KAY, supra note 20, at 221-24; Sedler, supra note 20, at 188. Other
scholars have recognized the phenomenon, but have labeled it differently. See, e.g., Leflar, True
"False Conflicts," supra note 26, at 171 (citations omitted):
The term "false conflicts" and its correlations do have application which can be truly
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recovery governing the consequences of negligence are juxta-
posed-Missouri's version of contributory negligence and Arkansas'
rule of comparative fault-rules that are in operation quite similar,
both permitting a negligent plaintiff to recover, but achieving that re-
sult by differing legal mechanisms.
Under Arkansas' Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act,58 the trial judge is to determine forum law, and his determination
is subject to appellate review. 9 It is fairly apparent why the Uniform
Act permits consideration by the court of "any relevant material or
source. . . whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under
the rules of evidence."'60 An accurate assessment of the law may re-
quire a full inquiry not only into statutes, but also into the construction
given them by foreign courts61 and, in some instances, the interpretive
assistance of those versed in foreign law.62
Although the Commissioners' Comment to section 4.0263 indicates
useful in the choice-of-law area. The term can describe cases in which there is no con-
flict of laws, that is, cases in which the laws of the two or more involved jurisdictions arc
the same, or would produce the same results in the case being litigated. In that situation
there is no need to make a choice between the laws of different states. The result is the
same under either law. At least it ordinarily ought to be.
Cf R. WErNTRAtu, supra note 28, at 39 ("Only one state will appear to have any 'interest' in
having its law applied, and its law should, therefore, be applied. The apparent conflict of laws is a
'false' conflict.").
An example of an apparent true conflict is presented by Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916),
a case usually considered in conflicts courses under the subject of constitutional limitations on
choice of law. Kryger involved cancellation of a contract to purchase land in North Dakota that
was entered into in Minnesota. The Supreme Court upheld the application of situs law in a can-
cellation and forfeiture proceeding in North Dakota. As Professor Brainerd Currie demonstrates,
"[in Kryger] the law of Minnesota was substantially the same as that of North Dakota." B. CUR-
RiE, supra note 16, at 268-69 (emphasis omitted). In ordinary conflicts theory Kryger thus illus-
trates an apparent true conflict; the implicated state laws differing only with respect to the nature
of the notice required. Compare id, with R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 28, at 387, in which Professor
Weintraub incorrectly refers to the situs of the land and the forum state as North Carolina.
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-2501 to 2507 (Supp. 1977).
59. Id § 27-2504(C).
60. Id § 27-2504(B).
61. Rice v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ark. 498, 238 S.W. 722 (1922) (construction of
applicable Oklahoma law grounded on statutes and judicial interpretation). See also ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-109 (1962).
62. Cf. Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 524, 249 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1952) ("In
our library we have the statutes and decisions of every other state, and it seldom takes more than a
few hours to find the answer to a particular question.").
63. The parallel Arkansas statute is ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2504(B) (Supp. 1977) ("In deter-
mining the law of any jurisdiction or governmental unit thereof outside this State, the court may
consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party
or admissible under the rules of evidence.)."
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the Act does not shift the burden of discovering foreign law upon the
court,64 sua sponte inquiry is desirable where the parties make an in-
complete or erroneous presentation. The requirement of a reasonable
level of inquiry should perhaps be addressed legislatively in amend-
ments to the Act or, alternatively, by rule in the practice of trial judges
and the Arkansas Supreme Court. One implication of Wallis is that
public law questions such as choice of law rules are not always satisfac-
torily articulated in private litigation.65
In Wallis, the court purports to adopt the Leflar methodology, which
calls for a choice of law determined by applying five "choice-influenc-
ing considerations. '66 The court's method, however, is eclectic,67 draw-
ing variously on the "significant relationship" test of the second
Restatement68 to displace the law of the situs (Missouri) and on Profes-
sor Leflar's analysis to determine the rule of recovery to apply
(Arkansas).69
64. Commissioners' Comment, UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT
§ 4.02:
The fear that a court might surprise the litigants with a decision based on its own re-
search seems more apparent than real. Should the court come upon material that di-
verges substantially from that presented by the parties, it should, at least in the normal
case, inform them of the fruits of its research.
In the event that the court cannot or does not wish to engage in its own research, it is
free to insist on a complete presentation of the issues of foreign law by counsel.
See also American Physicians Ins. Co. v. Hruska, 244 Ark. 1176, 1185, 428 S.W.2d 622, 627 (1968)
("an instruction cannot be questioned on appeal in the absence of an objection").
65. Professor Ehrenzweig makes the same point in rejecting interest analysis. A.
EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (1974).
66. See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 20, at 281; Leflar, supra note 26; Leflar, Conflict of
Laws: Arkansas-The Choice-Influencing Considerations, 28 ARK. L. REv. 199 (1974); Leflar, More
on Choice, supra note 25. "In essence, [Leflar's list of choice-influencing considerations] is a rec-
ognition of the freedom judges have in making choice of law decisions, as well as an exhortation
of them not only to be frank about stating the considerations actually used, but to reach results
compatible with those considerations." Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L.
REV. 202, 214 (1969).
67. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 20, at 222, 274. "[T]he new law of choice of law . . . in
practice is turning out to be an amalgamation of most of the realistic new ideas developed by
conflicts scholars." Id at 222 (citing Westmoreland, Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice of
Law Methodologies: The Case of Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REv. 407 (1975)).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971):
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship. . . to the occurrence and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
69. See 261 Ark. at 628-29, 550 S.W.2d at 459 (apparently adopting the analytic framework
of Sabel v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 36 Colo. App. 60, 536 P.2d 1160 (1975) ("rules of
conduct"-"rules of recovery")).
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A difficulty with the court's analytic approach is that the choice-in-
fluencing considerations and the "better rule of law" in particular are
better suited to the solution of false (and true) conflicts than to appar-
ent true conflicts. An apparent true conflict exists when two jurisdic-
tions have strong interests in the application of their respective laws,
which do not differ materially (the conflict is thus apparent and not
real). Unfortunately, the Wallis court obscured this distinction be-
tween false and true conflicts on one hand and apparent true conflicts
on the other by relying solely on false conflicts cases. For example, in
Babcock v. Jackson,7" Ontario's guest statute would have absolutely
precluded recovery for a New York guest injured in Ontario in a car
driven by a New York host. Ontario had no claim for application of its
harsh law precluding recovery, and New York, where the parties re-
sided, had a strong interest in permitting recovery. The case, therefore,
presented a classic false conflict. In Babcock, as in the remaining cases
cited in Wallis,7 the "better rule of law" can be applied to reach an
apparently satisfactory result because each presented a false conflict.
What the "better rule of law" neither identifies nor properly resolves
is the Wallis factual situation under an accurate view of Missouri law,
where two systems or rules are only in apparent conflict and where they
function to solve like problems in such similar fashion that the forum
law cannot properly be called better than its counterpart foreign law.
As will be seen, this inutility of the fifth choice-influencing considera-
tion caused substantial problems for the Arkansas Supreme Court in its
first conflicts case after Wallis.
Before turning to that case, it is necessary to clarify the role of Mis-
souri's rule of the road in the solution of Wallis' conflicts issue. The
problem contains two rules: Missouri's rule of the road, which deter-
mines negligence, and another rule (Missouri's? Arkansas'? Penn-
sylvania's?) governing the consequences of negligence, te., a rule of
recovery. One rule, Missouri's highway law, is not in conflict. The
other, the rule of recovery, is a conflicts issue, but the court need not
have reached it, as the discussion above indicates. Missouri's rule of
the road is not selected because it is part of the lex loci delici,72 which
70. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E. 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
71. Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 36 Colo. App. 60, 536 P.2d 1160 (1975);
Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974); Mitchell v.
Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1968); Woodward
v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968).
72. But see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 380(2) (1934):
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the Arkansas Supreme Court criticized as a choice of law method by
citing Babcock.7" Yet the court's conclusion may at first blush suggest
just that: "Missouri rules of the road are applicable to questions of al-
[Where by the law of the place of wrong, the liability creating character of the actor's
conduct depends upon the application of a standard of care, and such standard has been
defined in particular situations by statute or judicial decisions of the law of the place of
the actor's conduct, such application of the standard will be made by the forum.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 157 & Comment (c) (1971) appears to
foresee the displacement of a local standard of care in some limited instances:
(1) The law selected by application of the rules of § 145 ["The rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties. ... I determines the standard of care by which the actor's conduct
shall be judged.
(2) The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury
occurred.
c. 4pplication of Precise Standard. The forum will apply any precise standard of care
that is prescribed by the applicable law in determining whether or not the actor was
negligent. Such a precise standard of care may be established by a statute or ordinance.
If, for example, the actor's conduct involved a violation of a criminal statute, the applica-
ble law will determine (I) whether a tort standard of care can appropriately be derived
from the particular enactment and, if so, (2) whether the necessary conditions for doing
so have been met, such as that the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute was
designed to protect and that the harm which occurred was of the sort the statute was
designed to prevent. The applicable law will also determine whether violation of such a
statute or ordinance is conclusive evidence of negligence or prima facie evidence of neg-
ligence or merely some evidence of negligence which the jury is free to accept or reject as
it sees fit. Such a precise standard of care may also be established by common law rule.
So, if by common law rule in the state of the applicable law a motorist is negligent as a
matter of law if he crosses a railroad track without stopping, looking and listening, the
court will charge the jury to this effect, even though under the local law of the forum the
question whether the motorist was negligent in failing to stop, look and listen would be
for the jury to decide. In determining, on the other hand, whether the motorist did in
fact stop, look and listen, the court will apply its own rules of evidence and its own
judicial procedures.
See Gillespie v. Lawton, 234 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1964) (New York plaintiff, Connecticut
defendant, accident in Rhode Island). In Gillespie, both the statute in the defendant's jurisdiction
and the statute of the state where the accident occurred required that motor vehicles have ade-
quate brakes. In Connecticut such a failure was negligence as a matter of law, which would
support, absent factual issues of proximate cause and contributory negligence, a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability. Turner v. Scanlon, 146 Conn. 149, 148 A.2d 334 (1959);
Hamill v. Smith, 25 Conn. Supp. 183, 199 A.2d 343 (Super. Ct. 1964). Rhode Island did not treat
the question as negligence per se, but rather as a question for the jury. Gillespie v. Lawton, 234 F.
Supp. 821, 823 (D. Conn. 1964); Kenyon v. Murray, 90 R.I. 423, 159 A.2d 376 (1960). The court
denied summary judgment and applied Rhode Island law treating the question as one for the jury.
73. [T~he vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it fails to take
account of underlying policy considerations in evaluating the significance to be ascribed
to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs in determining the rights and liabilities
which arise out of that act. "The vice of the vested rights theory," it has been aptly
stated, "is that it affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the
practical considerations involved [citation omitted]." More particularly, as applied to
torts, the theory ignores the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort
occurred may have in the resolution of particular issues.
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leged negligence in the actual driving of the vehicle. At the time of the
accident, the parties were traveling the highways of Missouri and were
under a duty to obey the traffic laws in force there."74 Nor is it an
exercise of depecage,"7 applying different states' laws to different issues.
Instead, the rule of the road serves as datum76 "to the factual question
of whether the party's conduct was negligent rather than to whether
substantive liability will be imposed. 77 Where foreign law serves only
as datum, there is no conflicts issue,78 but a court must still properly
ascertain its content.
Since the decision in Wallis, the Arkansas Supreme Court has again
had an opportunity to address choice of law issues in an interstate tort
case. Williams v. Carr79 illustrates the problems inherent in applying
the Wallis decision and its unreliability as a model for the resolution of
some interstate torts conflicts problems. In Williams, two persons were
killed when a tractor trailer crossed the median on an interstate high-
way in Arkansas and struck them while they were standing in the road-
way discussing a prior accident with investigating officers. The parties
were residents and citizens of Tennessee, and both vehicles were li-
12 N.Y.2d at 478, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746, quoted in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie
Co., 261 Ark. at 626-27, 550 S.W.2d at 456.
74. 261 Ark. at 632, 550 S.W.2d at 458. See also id at 633, 550 S.W.2d at 459 ("this cause is
reversed and remanded as to Thomas Jeff Wallis with directions. . . to apply the Missouri law as
to the 'rules of the road' ").
75. See, e.g., Nelson v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959) (Arkansas statute of
limitations, Texas survival rule). Nelson is criticized in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 28, at 51. See
also Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice ofLaw, 73 COLUM, L. REv. 58 (1973);
von Mehren, Special Substantive Rulesfor Multistate Problems: Their Role and Signiflcance in Con-
temporary Choice ofLaw Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REv. 347 (1974); Weintraub, Beyond Depe.
cage:.A "New Rule"Approach to Choice 0/Law in Consumer Credit Transactions and a Critique of
the Territorial Application ofthe Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 16
(1974); Wilde, Depecage in the Choice of Tort Law, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 329 (1968).
76. Currie distinguished "(1) the purpose of finding a rule of decision, and (2) all other pur-
poses, including that of finding some datum made relevant by a rule of decision supplied by the
law of the forum." Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 756
(1963).
77. Sedler, Rules of Choice ofLaw Versus Choice ofLaw Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts
Torts Cases, 44 TatN. L. REv. 975, 1004 n.131 (1978).
78. One of the major differences between cases involving a reference to foreign law for
the purpose of establishing a datum point and for the purpose of finding a rule of deci-
sion is that in the datum point cases, typically, there is no potential conflict of policy and
interest with another state.
Indeed, such have been the blandishments of the traditional system of conflicts analy-
sis that the forum may not realize that no true conflict of interests is involved.
Kay, Conflict 0/Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 47, 63 (1963).
79. - Ark. -, 565 S.W.2d 400 (1978).
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censed and registered there.8" The case was tried to a jury apparently
under a comparative fault instruction,8' and the jury found that plain-
tiff and defendant were equally responsible for the accident.8 2 On ap-
peal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for
retrial.
Although Williams presents a false conflict, a comparison to a true
conflict that has been analyzed under the Leflar model demonstrates
the problem with attempting to resolve it by reference to the choice-
influencing considerations. In Kell v. Henderson, 3 perhaps best
thought of as a counterpart case to Babcock, two Ontario residents,
host and guest, were involved in an accident in New York. The New
York court applied New York law to permit recovery when Ontario
law would have denied it. In an article subsequent to the decision, Pro-
fessor Leflar reanalyzed Kell in light of the five choice-influencing con-
siderations,84 approved of its result, and noted New York's special
"status as a justice administering state . ..strongly concerned with
seeing that persons who come into the New York courts to litigate con-
troversies with substantial New York connections have these cases de-
termined according to rules consistent with New York concepts of
justice, or at least not inconsistent with them."85 Kell is followed and
said to be on all fours with a Minnesota case, Milkovich v. Saari,86
which expressly applied the "better rule of law." Both Kell 7 and
Milkovich were true conflicts. Both Ontario and the forum in each case
had relevant policies to vindicate by application of their respective
laws.
Professor Leflar's observation in his 1966 analysis of Kel 8 offers a
further clue to the problem of discerning the better law when two states
have only slightly differing approaches to a rule of recovery:
[An interest in adjudicating] according to rules consistent with [the fo-
80. Id at -, 565 S.W.2d at 401 nn.l & 2.
81. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.1 (1962). See Sunday v. Burk, 172 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Ark.
1959) (where both parties were equally negligent, neither can recover).
82. - Ark. at -, 565 S.W.2d at 402.
83. 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), ajt'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1966).
84. Leflar, More on Choice, supra note 25, at 1593-95.
85. Id at 1594.
86. 295 Minn. 155, 263 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (Ontario host and guest, injury in Minnesota;
Ontario requires a showing of gross negligence, Minnesota, ordinary negligence). See Sedler,
supra note 77, at 1007.
87. See Trautman, 4 Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REa. 465, 467 (1967).
88. Leflar, More on Choice, supra note 25, at 1593-94.
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rum's] concepts of justice, or at least not inconsistent with them. . will
not manifest itself clearly #f the out-of-stale rule does not run contrary to
some strong socio-legal policy of the forum, but it will become a major
consideration if there is such a strong opposing legal policy.8 9
What kind of conflict is present in Williams, a true conflict, a false
conflict, or an apparent true conflict? The question is basic since the
propriety of permitting nonresident plaintiffs and defendants to avoid
foreign law in an Arkansas forum depends on whether Tennessee's
contributory negligence law is analogous to the odious Ontario guest
statute in Kell and Milkovich. Williams presents a false conflict. Ar-
kansas has no interest to vindicate by applying its law to Tennessee
residents who are adequately provided for under their law. This in-
vites, in turn, a consideration of the facts of Williams in light of Ten-
nessee law.
The accident litigated in Williams occurred in Arkansas. As in
Wallis,9" the court applied "the rules of the road of the state where the
tortious conduct occurred. . ".."I  Again, as in Wallis, the implicated
jurisdictions had different rules of recovery: Tennessee follows the
common law standard of contributory negligence.92 Further, Tennes-
see law distinguishes between proximate contributory negligence,
which bars recovery, and remote contributory negligence, which only
mitigates damages.93 Whether plaintiff's negligence is proximate or re-
mote is usually a jury question,94 and when an issue of proximate con-
tributory negligence has been resolved in plaintiffs favor, and thus
presents no bar to recovery, there remains the possible issue of remote
contributory negligence.
The Tennessee Supreme Court approved the following content for a
charge on the issue of proximate-remote contributory negligence:
[Remote contributory negligence is] that negligence which is too far re-
moved as to time or place, or causative force, to be a direct or proximate
cause of the accident. We suggest that an appropriate charge would state
the foregoing definition and add: "If you find the plaintiff guilty of such
89. Id at 1594 (emphasis added).
90. 261 Ark. at 633, 550 S.W.2d at 458.
91. -Ark. at-, 565 S.W.2d at 404.
92. See Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1976). See also Wade, Crawford, & Ryder,
Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions. Past, Present, and Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423
(1974).
93. Perry v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 502 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1974).
94. McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505 (1950).
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remote contributory negligence, you must reduce the recovery which you
would otherwise award, in proportion to plaintifis contribution to the
injury. ,9
5
In this setting, the determination by the Williams majority that plain-
tiffs' decedents were free from negligence as a matter of law96 presents
a complication that is only partially suggested by the dissent. 97 A find-
ing of plaintiffs' freedom from negligence will not only deprive defend-
ants9 of a defense but also of a possible reduction of damages since
applying Tennessee law could lead to a finding of insufficient fault to
bar recovery (i e., that the fault was remote and not proximate) or that
plaintiffs' negligence should reduce the recovery. 99 The majority hold-
ing, in apparent disregard of the nuances of Tennessee law, now ren-
ders its application on remand difficult, if not impossible."°
The most troubling part of the Williams opinion is its handling of the
choice of laws governing recovery'01 as compared with the rule appli-
95. Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Tenn. 1976).
96. -Ark. at -, 565 S.W.2d at 403.
97. Id at -, 565 S.W.2d at 405 (Smith, J., dissenting).
98. On remand there will be an additional defendant because the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed a directed verdict on whether one defendant was an agent of another defendant. Id
99. For a summary of three questions for the jury presented under Tennessee law, see Wade,
Crawford, & Ryder, supra note 92, at 440 (citations omitted):
First, it is a question for the jury whether plaintiffs conduct amounts to negligence at all.
Of course, this question may be resolved as a matter of law by the judge if he finds that
reasonable men would not differ.
Second, the jury must decide the nature of the causal relationship which exists be-
tween the contributory negligence and the injury. Plaintiff's negligence may be found to
be proximate, or remote, or irrelevant. It is normally for the jury to make the determina-
tion. Some cases seem to hold that in all instances of contributory negligence the jury
must be instructed on remote contributory negligence and thus be given the opportunity
to mitigate damages on that basis. The position occasionally is taken that there need be
no instruction on remote contributory negligence if the jury could not reasonably have
found the negligence to be remote, and directed verdicts have often been granted be-
cause of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Finally, of course, if the jury finds that there is contributory negligence which is re-
mote, then it must determine the amount of mitigation of damages. This question is
peculiarly the province of the jury and the courts will not lightly overturn a jury award.
It should be noted, however, that if the jury finds that there is remote contributory negli-
gence, it must reduce the damages by some amount; in this it has no discretion. It is
reversible error for the court to fail to make this clear to the jury.
100. Justice Smith's dissent in Williams presents a succinct review of the issues. - Ark. at-,
565 S.W.2d at 405-06 (Smith, J., dissenting): "Since the jury might believe that the decedents
carelessly remained too long in a place of danger, which actually contributed to their death, I
cannot agree that the issue of their possible negligence has no place in the case." See also note 94
supra.
101. -Ark. at -, 565 S.W.2d at 404 ("the trial court committed error in not applying Ten-
nessee's substantive law inasmuch as both appellants-plaintiffs and appellees-defendants are resi-
dents of the State of Tennessee").
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cable to conduct on the highways. 102 Although ostensibly adhering to
the concept of choosing a "rule based on the 'most significant relation-
ship' as affected by the [five] choice-influencing considerations,"'' 0 3 the
court adds the following cryptic dictum: "[H]owever the parties may
elect to be governed by both Arkansas' substantive law and rules of the
road."'" Application of Arkansas law is justifiable only if Arkansas
and Tennessee legal policies are in substantial conflict, i e., if they can
be said to resemble the guest statute-ordinary negligence conflict of
Kell and Milkovich. Indeed, the ameliorating factors, such as last clear
chance' 0 and the distinction between remote and proximate contribu-
tory negligence, suggest a system that "does not run contrary to some
strong socio-legal policy of the forum," 6 and therefore Arkansas law
should not be available even at the parties' election. In Williams, Ar-
kansas had no interest save perhaps in its rule of the road. 0 7 It had
only its "fairer and more economically equitable standard of liabil-
ity,"'0 8 which is not so strikingly superior as to be "better" than the
Tennessee law it should be applying to the Tennessee parties.
It is regrettable that Wallis and Williams were the first two cases at-
tempted under Professor Leflar's analysis. Wallis was born of legal
mistake. Not only does the court's approach defy Leflar's proce-
dure--"A state's 'governmental interest' in a set of facts can be ana-
lyzed only by reference to the content of the competing rules of
law' 9-but it reaches a choice of law effected in a legal vacuum-a
conflict of laws hardly ripe for judicial resolution. Williams com-
102. Id "[Tihe rules of the road of the state where the tortious conduct occurred are applied."
The distinction between rules of conduct and rules of recovery is apparently approved in Wallis
by adoption of the former's use in Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 36 Colo. App. 60,
536 P.2d 1160 (1975). 261 Ark. at 633, 550 S.W.2d at 459.
103. - Ark. at -, 565 S.W.2d at 404.
104. Id
105. "We adopt [the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479, 480] as the law in Tennessee
governing last clear chance and overrule all the cases in conflict with the principles contained
therein." Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 583 (Tenn. 1976). For the text of the adopted provi-
sions, see id at 583-84.
106. Leflar, More on Choice, supra note 25, at 1594. See also von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927 (1975): "An approach in terms of 'the
better rule of law' probably complicates the problem [of principled, comprehensible, and
noninvidious solutions to choice of law questions] even further, unless general agreement were to
exist on the standards by which superiority was to be judged." Id at 952-53.
107. Cf. Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 514 (Miss. 1968) ("A primary consideration in
determining applicable law is the advancement of the forum's governmental interests.").
108. 261 Ark. at 629, 550 S.W.2d at 457.
109. Leflar, More on Choice, supra note 25, at 1587.
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pounds the error of Wallis by failing to see the limits of "the better rule
of law" and commending its application where it does not yield a just
result.
Admittedly, lex loci delicti has led to harsh results for Arkansas
plaintiffs, 1 0 and this may have induced the Wallis court to lay it
aside."' But Wallis was not the appropriate case for adopting a new
choice of law rule. And Williams, which purported to follow Wallis,
not only lacks the coherent methodology on which practitioners must
rely, but also in its improvident dictum about electing Arkansas' sub-
stantive law illustrates one of the major limitations of the "better rule
of law."
Given the inauspicious beginnings of modem conflicts analysis in
Arkansas, perhaps state and federal courts" 2 should view Wallis as
merely having adopted a rule of flexibility in choice of law in interstate
torts rather than a particular method or theory of choosing."1 3 Wallis
did not present a proper case for adopting the new rule, and its founda-
tion on an erroneous view of foreign law is likely to have serious reper-
cussions on Arkansas' choice of law development unless future cases
avoid its pitfalls and those of Williams, which followed its uncertain
beginnings.
110. See Wheeler v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 207 Ark. 601, 182 S.W.2d 214
(1944) (wrongful death action barred by Missouri's one-year statute of limitations where injury
occurred in Missouri, and death occurred in Arkansas whose two-year statute of limitations would
have permitted the action); Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S.W.
21 (1923) (Oklahoma workman's compensation was exclusive remedy for injury occurring in
Oklahoma when Arkansas did not preclude recovery in tort).
111. Territorialism has persisted and acquired new proponents and modem dress. E.g., D.
CAVERS, supra note 28; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialisam and Professor Cavers- he Penn-
sylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REV. 373 (1971). The territorialist position is considered along with
the other major modem alternative to interest analysis-narrow, policy-based rules-in Sedler,
supra note 20, at 204-16.
112. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (conflicts rules applied in
federal court must conform to those prevailing in state court).
113. Particularly apt is Ehrenzweig's caveat against theories as sources of law. Ehrenzweig, A
Proper Law in a Proper Forum. A "Restatement" of the '"1x Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. Rav.
340 (1965); see R. CRAMTON, D. CuRsuE, & H. KAY, supra note 20, at 304.
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